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Abstract
While Hume had a favorable opinion of the new commercial society, 
Reid envisioned a utopian system that would eliminate private property 
and substitute the profit incentive with a system of state-conferred hon-
ors. Reid’s predilection for a centralized command economy cannot be 
explained by his alleged discovery of market failures and has to be con-
sidered in the context of his moral psychology. Hume tried to explain 
how the desire for gain that motivates the merchant leads to industry 
and frugality. These, in their turn, benefit all society. Reid still saw the 
desire for money as a degenerate form of the desire for power. The con-
trast between Hume and Reid, however, must not be taken too far. On 
some particular matters of economic policy, such as paper credit, Hume 
and Reid eventually came to similar views.
1. Introduction
It is a tempting oversimplification to see in Thomas 
Reid (1710–96) an archenemy of David Hume (1711–
76). According to this view, Reid’s various criticisms 
of Hume’s philosophy would be yet another episode 
of an unending war being played out throughout the
* All quotations from Reid’s manuscripts have been reproduced with 
kind permission of the Special Collections Centre, Aberdeen Univer-
sity Library. A version of this paper has been presented at a panel on 
Hume sponsored by the Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society 
and held at the meeting of the American Society for Eighteenth-Century 
Studies in March 2011. The author wishes to thank the participants to 
the panel, especially Mark G. Spencer, chair and organizer, and Roger 
J. Fechner for bibliographic references. Another version of this paper
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centuries.1 Since our age of “culture wars” is not immune 
from understanding philosophical and theological dis-
putes as having far-reaching practical consequences, it is 
easy to see Reid and Hume as being at odds on almost 
every conceivable issue. This view has perhaps some foun-
dation of truth. For example, in the late 1750s and early 
1760s, while a regent at King’s College, Aberdeen, Reid 
was busy writing drafts of An Inquiry into the Human Mind 
on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), a book in which 
he sees Hume’s philosophy as the inevitable skeptical 
outcome of what he calls “the way of ideas.” On the back 
pages of one of the drafts, he was also penning an essay on 
justice, attacking Hume’s view that justice is an artificial 
virtue. This paper on justice would eventually be expanded 
into a lengthy chapter of the Essays on the Active Powers 
of Man (1788).2
Reid and Hume also had conflicting opinions of the value 
of the emerging commercial society. It is difficult, however, 
has been presented at the Hume Society Conference in July 2012. 
The author wishes to thank Margaret Schabas for her comments. The 
author also wishes to thank his colleagues Ross Hickey and Peter Wylie 
for comments on the paper.
1. In his biography of Reid, Alexander Campbell Fraser speaks of 
the philosophical alternatives present at the time of his writing as 
representing “an unending struggle between skeptical distrust of the 
Universal Power, ignorantly worshipped, and reasonable ethical faith in 
the Universal Power, with consequent hope for men. It is in Scotland a 
new form of the war with David Hume to which Reid’s life was given. It 
has been going on since Socrates argued with the Sophists at Athens 
and since Job justified the morality of Providence among the Eastern 
emirs” (Alexander Campbell Fraser, Thomas Reid [New York: Scribner’s 
Sons, 1898], 155). As can been seen, the two sides of this unending 
struggle are variously described. 
2. See Aberdeen University Library [hereafter referred to as AUL], 
MS 2131/1/I/1. See Essays on the Active Powers of Man, ed. Knud 
Haakonssen and James A. Harris (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2002), essay 5, chap. 5, on pp. 301–27. In this chapter, Reid 
argues that the right of property is not innate, and yet it follows 
naturally from the right to life and liberty. There are, however, limits to 
the exercise of the right of property. Most likely, the notes on the back of 
AUL MS 2131/1/I/1 are part of a draft of a question discussed by Reid 
for a meeting of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society on 22 November 
1758: “Whether justice be a natural or artificial virtue?”
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to find out the precise connection between this disagree-
ment and their more widely studied views in epistemology, 
ethics, and moral psychology. My ultimate goal is to render 
intelligible the connections between these philosophers’ 
economic positions and their moral theories. The present 
essay is to begin this task by focusing on their respective 
evaluations of the entrepreneur’s moral character.3 
I will also show that the thesis of a constant and inevi-
table rift between Hume and Reid is not borne out by their 
views on particular issues of economy policy. Although 
Reid entertained a maximalist project of abolition of pri-
vate property, he did offer practical suggestions for pro-
moting welfare without fundamentally altering the state of 
the society in which he lived. We will thus see that Hume 
and Reid were closer to each other in their views on paper 
credit, a contentious issue in the eighteenth century.
2. Reid’s Utopia
We are familiar with Hume’s qualified but generally favor-
able view of the nascent commercial society, of what Adam 
Smith called the “natural system of liberty.”4 Reid, how-
ever, like many others, was not enthusiastic about the 
new commercial society. After all, in his late paper, “Some 
Thoughts on the Utopian System” (1794), he proposed 
3. The expression “entrepreneur” may sound anachronistic when 
applied to the eighteenth century, and it would be better to speak 
merely of the emerging class of merchants. But a generic notion of 
entrepreneur was not unfamiliar, as can be seen from the quote I give 
below, in section 7, where Reid speaks of “heads capable of contriving 
and executing schemes of trade more extensive than their own fortunes 
without credit can enable them to carry on” (AUL MS 2131/2/II/16, 
fol. 1r). As can be seen from this quote, it also would be proper to 
distinguish “the capitalist,” who lends money at interest, from “the 
entrepreneur,” who conjures up and executes plans in which this 
money is employed productively in order to yield a profit out of which 
the capitalist can be paid. However, this distinction is not so important 
for our characterization of the new commercial mindset on which Hume 
and Reid had a different opinion.
4. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), bk. 4, chap. 9, para. 51, in 2:687–88. 
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an ideal form of government that would necessitate the 
abolition of private property and a centralized command 
economy.5 The profit motive as incentive for productivity 
would be replaced in this new commonwealth by a sys-
tem of state-conferred ranks and honors to which the 
best and brightest could aspire.6 This form of government 
would thus discourage greed, the source of so many evils, 
and would, rather, appeal to the natural desire for public 
esteem, an affection naturally allied to virtue.7 At the same 
time, Reid thought that his utopian protosocialist republic 
should trade with other countries.8 
In Reid’s mind, the abolition of private property would 
have as a consequence the abolition of the taxes that the 
government must levy on private companies and individ-
uals in order to finance its activities. All property would 
be public, and everybody would work for the government 
in Reid’s republic. This means the disappearance of a 
whole parasitic sector of the economy: in Reid’s system, 
there would not be any need for corporate lawyers and 
5. AUL MS 3061/6, in Thomas Reid, Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and 
Papers on Natural Religion, Self-Government, Natural Jurisprudence, 
and the Law of Nations, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 277–99. The paper was read at a meeting of the 
Glasgow Literary Society in 1794. 
6. See Reid, Practical Ethics, 290–91. 
7. Ibid., 282 and 285. A state with a centralized command economy, 
where all the means of production are owned by the state and no free 
exchange of goods and services is allowed among its citizens, can be 
properly called a socialist state  Nevertheless, it must be noted that 
“socialism” was not a category of contemporary analysis understood in 
Reid’s time. 
8. Ibid., 292. The utopian republic’s trade with other countries would 
be directed and controlled by the state, and so, strictly speaking, could 
not be called “free trade.” But the republic as a whole would participate 
in an international market system: “It is obvious that in a Utopian 
state the Subjects can have no Traffick either with one another or with 
Foreigners: but the State may be Commercial. It may be so with great 
advantage; having the whole Stock of the Nation in its disposal. And 
it ought to be so, that what, in the produce of the Nations Industry is 
over and above its Consumption, may be disposed of to other Nations or 
Individuals for its Value & that the Utopians may be supplied with such 
foreign Commodities as are necessary or convenient” (292). 
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tax consultants—even better, there would not be any need 
for most private law, including inheritance law. Thus, the 
legislative activity of the government would diminish: no 
private property, no need for laws to regulate it and tax 
it.9 With characteristic candor, Reid acknowledges that 
one drawback of his system might be the expansion of the 
“executive” branch of the government.10 In different terms, 
he rightly predicts an increase in the bureaucracy neces-
sary to keep tabs with whatever people are doing, and with 
how much they are producing. Like many supporters of 
centralized command economies ever since, Reid thinks 
that busybody bureaucrats and “technicians,” armed with 
statistics and census, will solve all problems in the alloca-
tion of scarce resources.11
9. Ibid., 295. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., 294–95. Reid’s protosocialist ideas were not original. Reid was 
influenced primarily by Sir Thomas More’s Utopia, but also by James 
Harrington’s Oceana, and the writings of his Aberdonian friend, William 
Ogilvie. For a discussion of Reid’s utopian scheme and his sources, 
see the introduction by Knud Haakonssen to Reid, Practical Ethics, 
76–85; Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From 
Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 216–25; Paul Wood, “Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher: 
A Study of Science and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment” 
(PhD diss., University of Leeds, 1984), 182–86; and Shinichi Nagao, 
introduction to Politics and Society in Scottish Thought, ed. Shinichi 
Nagao (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), 18–20. Notwithstanding his 
radical utopian ideals, Reid made clear to his audience in 1794 that he 
was not advocating any violent revolutionary change to the then-existing 
system of government: “The Change made at the Revolution in 1688 
was violent indeed but necessary. [. . .] Since that time, we have had no 
Revolution, but such gradual and peaceable changes, by new Laws, as 
have improved the Constitution and greatly promoted the Prosperity of 
the Nation; and it is to be hoped we may long continue to have such” 
(Reid, Practical Ethics, 280). According to Reid, two questions have to 
be distinguished in politics. First, we can ask which form of government 
best contributes to human happiness. Second, we can ask in which way 
an existing form of government “can be changed, and reduced to a Form 
which we think more eligible” (277). At the end of the paper, he further 
says: “If we see, or think we see, Imperfections in the Constitution or 
in the Government, we ought to consider that there never was a perfect 
human Government on Earth; We ought to view such Defects, not with 
a Censorious and Malignant Eye, but with that Candor and Indulgence 
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3. The Justification of Reid’s Utopian System: 
Market Failure?
We can make a few observations concerning Reid’s utopian 
system. First, although the system does away with private 
property, free enterprise, and a free market, its centralized 
command economy is meant to produce, not an egalitar-
ian society, but rather a society where higher productiv-
ity is rewarded by the central committee of experts with a 
higher rank, and consequently with all the goods proper 
to that rank. Among these goods, Reid stresses some eigh-
teenth-century status symbols, such as “Servants, Horses, 
Chariots, Houses and Furniture”: their “Splendor and 
Magnificence” constitute the highest reward that the state 
can give.12 
What Reid has in mind is a gigantic rank-awarding 
bureaucracy, similar to a university or an army encom-
passing the whole society.13 Indeed, the primary goal of 
this system is not simply the most efficient allocation of 
scarce resources but the promotion of virtue and knowl-
edge in people (these are listed among the subordinate 
goals of government in his lectures on “police”).14 Reid 
with which we perceive the Defects of our Dearest Friends. It is onely 
Atrocious Conduct that can dissolve the Sacred tie. While that is not the 
case, every prudent and gentle mean should be used to strengthen and 
confirm it” (299). Reid had some reason for concern. He had supported 
the French Revolution and, as late as 1791, he had agreed to serve 
as steward for a Bastille Day celebration of the “Glasgow Friends of 
Liberty.” The prefatory remarks were published in a journal with the 
title “Observations on the Dangers of Political Innovation.” On Reid’s 
attitudes to reform and revolution, see the works listed above, in this 
note, by Haakonssen, Nagao, and Wood. 
12. Reid, Practical Ethics, 291. 
13. The comparison with the university is explicit (Reid, Practical Ethics, 290). 
14. See AUL MS 2131/4/III/9, fol. 2r. According to Reid, the chief ends 
of political society are (1) security from foreign enemies and (2) the 
maintenance of peace and justice among subjects. He also recognized 
some subordinate ends that “tho’ not necessary to the being and 
continuance of it may yet conduce greatly to its well-being & Prosperity” 
(AUL MS 2131/4/III/9, fol. 2r). Among them, he lists population, 
virtue, learning and knowledge, riches and opulence, public revenue, 
and arms. See also AUL MS 2131/4/III/10, fol. 1r. 
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wants philosophers to be kings (or more simply, he wants 
the professors of philosophy to be kings).
Second, Reid does not conceive of this republic as a world 
government; rather, it would exist in a single country, 
which may then engage in commerce with other countries, 
if so needed. Reid’s system is thus only one of “socialism in 
one country”: countries would continue to trade with each 
other and draw benefits from this commerce. Reid’s prima 
facie acceptance of “free” trade among countries should 
make us skeptical of a purely economic explanation of 
Reid’s rejection of a free commercial society. This eco-
nomic explanation has been suggested by Shinichi Nagao 
in his comprehensive study of Reid’s papers on political 
economy.15 According to Nagao, Reid rejected a free market 
economy because of what he saw as its inevitable failure in 
efficiently allocating scarce resources.
Nagao’s interpretation is brilliant: in his Glasgow lec-
tures on political economy, Reid had come to subscribe 
to Adam Smith’s theory concerning the natural price of 
commodities.16 He then noticed the role that expectations 
15. See Shinichi Nagao, “The Political Economy of Thomas Reid,” Journal 
of Scottish Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2003): 21–33. 
16.  The first edition of Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations appeared in 1776, but Reid’s references to 
natural price and a labor theory of value in his lectures on “police” are 
from the 1760s. Nagao conjectures that Reid may have had access to 
Smith’s lecture notes: this is “a very attractive hypothesis” supported 
by what Reid says in his inaugural lecture delivered on 10 October 
1764 (see AUL MS 2131/4/II/9). In this lecture, as Nagao notices, Reid 
declares his willingness to “borrow light” from his predecessor’s theory. 
Nagao also notices the differences between Reid and Smith: “Reid 
explained the function of natural price in his lectures. Natural price 
is defined in terms of the costs of producing a commodity by labour. 
Reid’s definition of natural price looks more simplistic than the one 
that Smith formulated in his lectures at Glasgow University. It is rather 
a primitive labour value theory because Reid’s natural price includes 
neither profit not rent” (Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 24). Reid’s 
labor theory of value can be found in AUL MSS 4/III/15, fol. 1r–v, and 
4/III/17, 1r–2r (in Reid, Practical Ethics, 162–66). For a comparison 
with Smith’s labor theory, see Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, chap. 5, 
in 1:47–64. Reid’s labor theory of value is modest in its aim: it states 
simply that the natural price of commodities is ultimately determined 
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and inventory play in making actual market prices 
depart from their natural price. According to Nagao, Reid 
took these price deviations as instances of the failure of 
markets in making supply and demand meet: “For Reid, 
the market prices of commodities fluctuate not only in 
proportion to changes in demand and supply. In the 
argument, it looks as if he was trying to demonstrate 
the unstable nature of market prices.”17 The argument 
Nagao alludes to is to be found in this example given by 
Reid:
Thus Suppose two Countries A & B have a Mutual Commerce 
in Corn & that Neither of them deals with any Other Country 
in that Commodity. [Country] A commonly furnishes B with 
10.000 Quarters of Wheat & has no more to Spare. In a 
Certain Year B has a demand for ten thousand Quarters 
as usual but A can onely spare 7000. I apprehend that in 
this Case the price would rise more than in the proportion 
of 7 to 10. [. . .] On the other hand if A has 15.000 quarters 
to spare and has no other Market than with B this would 
probably sink the price more than in the proportion of 15 
to 10.18
In the case of a fall in supply, Reid would suggest, 
the price will rise more than in proportion to this fall 
because buyers, predicting a further reduction in sup-
ply, will try to buy as much as possible (but the supply 
will not fall more). In the case of an increase in supply, 
the price will fall more than in proportion to the increase 
of supply because sellers, predicting that the demand 
is much smaller than it is, will try to sell as much as 
possible (but the demand has not changed). Nagao 
draws a more general conclusion from this situation:
by the cost of labor, but this latter is still a money price. There is no 
attempt to reduce money prices to something else. 
17. Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 27. 
18. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fol. 2r. Reid lists one factor that would 
limit the increase in price in the case of a reduction in supply of corn: 
“However, it must be acknowledged that much would depend upon 
the possibility or easiness of Supplying the Want of Corn by other 
provisions” (Ibid.).
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The buyers and sellers of both countries behave according to 
subjective demand and supply curves that are different from 
actual ones, because they cannot have exact knowledge of 
how much the demand and supply will be in the countries 
where their customers and suppliers are living. [. . .] The 
results of the exchanges described above are not likely to 
achieve market equilibrium, for the prices are not determined 
at the balancing point of demand and supply. Under these 
conditions, there will be much more unsatisfied demand and 
unsold goods than those created solely by the movements of 
demand and supply.19
In the next section, I will make a few remarks on Nagao’s 
reconstruction and show that Reid himself never thought 
that the wheat market example is an instance of market 
failure. Admittedly, Nagao circumscribes the scope and 
import of his thesis. First, he acknowledges that Reid does 
not mention explicitly expectations in the case of the wheat 
market example. Second, Nagao acknowledges that Reid’s 
argument and the additional arguments Reid makes on 
inventory are only about short-term changes in prices. 
These short-term changes are compatible with the long- or 
medium-term adjustment process whereby natural price 
is eventually reached.20 As a result of these remarks, it 
will become clear that Reid’s case against a commercial 
society cannot be based merely on an argument about its 
inefficiency in allocating scarce resources.
19. Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 28. 
20. Nagao says: “There is a possibility that these arguments could 
have been mounted in order to demonstrate the logical defects of 
the market mechanism as well as to point out the actual difficulties 
of determining how much the natural price of a commodity really is.” 
He adds: “The importance of these remarks on price, however, must 
not be emphasised too much. [. . .] Reid repeats that prices, once they 
have deviated from natural price, have a tendency to return to it. For, 
theoretically speaking, his argument is about short-term changes of 
prices, while Smith’s argument is about the long or medium-term 
adjustment process, a process that presupposes the existence of the 
movements of capital between sectors. Thus, both could be combined 
in the same theory. Nevertheless, if the capital flow does not occur for 
some reason, then the strength of Reid’s argument becomes obvious” 
(Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 30). 
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4. Expectations and Inventory
4.1. Supply and Demand
In his discussion of the wheat market example, Nagao col-
lapses the distinction drawn by Reid between two different 
mechanisms of price formation. Reid indeed distinguishes 
the laws of supply and demand from a theory of natural 
price. In Reid’s theory, natural price is ultimately deter-
mined by the cost of production, or, more specifically, the 
cost of the human labor that goes into the production of a 
good. After mentioning the natural price of commodities, 
Reid proceeds to isolate further mechanisms in the deter-
mination of market prices, and, first of all, supply and 
demand. Changes in supply and demand make the prices 
of commodities depart from their natural prices. Thus, the 
particular case of price formation discussed by Reid in the 
example above mentioned would at best be a departure 
from the equilibrium expected according the laws of supply 
and demand, rather than a departure from natural price. It 
would not be simply an exception to natural price, but an 
exception to supply and demand equilibrium—in different 
words, an exception to the exception. Indeed, Reid intro-
duces the wheat market example just after the exposition 
of the laws of supply and demand with these words: “The 
Increase or Decrease of the price of Commodities is not 
alwise [sic] in the Simple proportion of the Causes above 
mentioned, but Commonly as I apprehend in a Greater.”21 
The causes to which Reid alludes are (a) the increase of 
demand or reduction of supply of a commodity and (b) the 
reduction of demand or increase of supply of a commodity. 
While the first makes prices go up, the latter makes prices 
go down, but, as Reid claims, the change of price is not 
always in the simple proportion of these causes. It turns 
out, as I will explain below when I come to discuss the role 
of inventory, that the wheat market example is not even an 
objection to the laws of supply and demand, but rather an 
21. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fol. 1v. 
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explication of them. It is in the context of this discussion 
of inventory that Reid opposes price as determined by sup-
ply and demand, to price as determined by natural value.
4.2. Opinions about Supply and Demand 
As Nagao himself acknowledges, while Reid explicitly dis-
cusses the role of inventory in relation to the wheat market 
example, he does not explicitly mention the role of expec-
tations.22 Nagao’s reading may be justified by what Reid 
says in a previous passage of the manuscript whereby he 
introduces the first law of supply and demand that relates 
increases in price to a reduction of supply or an increase 
in demand: 
When Commodities have once come to settle at their Natural 
price, That price cannot be afterwards increased [. . .] but by 
an Increase of the Demand or a Decrease of the Commodity. 
Or at least by a general Opinion of the Increase of the 
Demand or Decrease of the Commodity. 
In either of these cases the fear of the Commodity lying on 
hand decreases in the Seller & makes him insist on a greater 
price. The buyer is prompted to offer a higher price lest the 
Commodity be all taken up by other buyers.23
A widespread belief in the increase of demand or in the 
reduction of supply of a commodity has the same effect as 
an actual increase of the demand or an actual reduction of 
supply: this opinion increases the price of the commodity. 
If we apply this view to Reid’s example, a general opin-
ion among buyers and sellers of a reduction in the supply 
of wheat greater than the actual reduction determines an 
additional increase in the price of wheat. 
Reid mentions “opinion” in his presentation of the sec-
ond law of supply and demand: “The Decrease of the price 
22. Nagao acknowledges that only inventory is mentioned explicitly by 
Reid in the discussion of the wheat market example. Expectations are 
mentioned explicitly by Reid in the case of another factor that makes 
prices depart from natural price, taxation (Nagao, “Political Economy of 
Reid,” 29). 
23. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fols. 1v–2r. 
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of a Commodity must [. . .] be occasioned by an Increase of 
the Commodity or a Decrease of the Demand, either Real 
or in [the General] opinion.”24 The law tells us that a reduc-
tion of demand or an increase of supply makes prices fall. 
In a similar fashion, a general opinion of the reduction of 
the demand or of the increase of the supply of a commod-
ity determines a reduction in its price. If we apply this view 
to Reid’s example, a general opinion of a reduction of the 
demand of wheat, even when the demand for wheat has 
not actually diminished, determines an additional reduc-
tion of its price on top of the reduction of price due to a real 
increase in its supply. 
4.3. Expectations and Supply-Demand Equilibrium 
Although Reid says that opinions about the status of 
demand and supply make prices depart from the equilib-
rium expected according to real demand and supply, this 
point is not an objection to the laws of supply and demand. 
The cases described by Reid describe how equilibrium, 
as determined by real supply and demand, is eventually 
reached.
It is certainly unrealistic to think that buyers and sellers 
always and perfectly know the status of supply and demand, 
but it is also unrealistic to infer from this obvious fact that 
actors in the market are always and systematically deluded 
about the status of supply and demand (unless some expla-
nation is given for this systematic delusion). Reid himself is 
quick to circumscribe the role played by opinions:
A General opinion of the Increase of the Demand or Decrease 
of the Commodity will have the same Effect for a Time. But 
Commonly Such Opinions if ill founded do not last long in a 
Civilized Country people being very attentive to their Interest 
and not easily deceived in that Respect where their passions 
do not blind them.25
24. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fol. 2r. In this passage, Reid crossed out the 
words I put in square brackets: “in [the General] opinion.” 
25. Ibid. 
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Buyers and sellers in “a civilized country” are attentive to 
their interests and not easily deceived (unless blinded by 
passions). Hence, they will not be long deluded by wrong 
opinions. Rather than objecting to the laws of supply and 
demand, Reid seems here to allude to the harsh but civi-
lizing discipline of the free market. Anybody who indulges 
in fantasies about changes in supply and demand will be 
driven out of business by those buyers and sellers who 
guess right. The account of profits and losses in balance 
sheets makes people prudent and cool-minded in their 
dealings.
Let’s now address Nagao’s point about the role of expec-
tations in the wheat market example. Expectations are 
opinions about the future status of demand and supply, 
and therefore about future prices. Buyers and sellers act 
in the role of speculators whenever they bid prices on the 
basis of their expectations. Some speculators buy more 
wheat and bid up its price when they behave in the expec-
tation of a reduction in supply greater than the actual 
one. They hope that a reduction in supply greater than the 
actual one will determine a further increase in the price of 
wheat, from which they will somehow profit. In different 
terms, these speculators change their demand schedule, 
but not those buyers who guess right about future supply. 
In the second case described by Reid, some speculators 
will try to undersell others in the expectation of a further 
drop in price. In Reid’s description of the expectations of 
sellers, this drop in price would be the result of a reduction 
in the demand of wheat greater than the actual one. But 
those sellers who guess right about future demand will not 
change their supply schedules. 
Eventually, those buyers and sellers who engage in 
wrong speculations in these two situations would realize 
that their predictions are mistaken. In the first case, the 
supply does not fall as much as speculators predicted 
and a surplus of wheat develops: buyers and sellers start 
underbidding the misguided speculators and will eventu-
ally bring down the price to equilibrium. In the second 
case, demand has not fallen as much as the misguided 
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speculators predicted, and a shortage of wheat devel-
ops: buyers and sellers start overbidding these specula-
tors and will eventually bring up the price to equilibrium. 
So, both the surplus and the shortage that result from 
wrong speculations about future prices are the mecha-
nisms that ensure that prices eventually reach the equi-
librium predicted by the relative change of supply and 
demand. It would then really seem remarkable if Reid took 
these temporary rises and falls above and below the new 
equilibrium prices as symptomatic of a market failure.26
As Nagao suggests, Reid could have constructed such 
deviations as failures of the laws of supply and demand 
only by mistaking a temporary deviation from equilibrium 
price for a permanent deviation from equilibrium price. In 
other words, Reid would have to have thought that the 
unregulated free market leads to inefficient allocation of 
goods, with permanent shortages and gluts. Hence, he 
could have justified, in mere economic terms, the neces-
sity of a “scientific,” centralized, top-down management of 
the economy of his ideal society.
This interpretation of the role of opinions (or expecta-
tions) in the transition between one equilibrium price and 
another is a feature of Reid’s analysis that is worth com-
paring with what Hume says concerning another case of 
transition between one equilibrium price and another. In 
his discussion of the balance of trade, Hume famously 
analyzes the effects of increases and reductions in the 
supply of money. A higher supply of money in a market, 
hypothetically sealed-off from foreign markets, leads to a 
corresponding reduction of the price of money: fewer units 
of a good than before are needed to buy a unit of money. 
That means, in different terms, that a unit of money can 
buy fewer goods. In short, the money prices of goods 
rise. Conversely, a smaller supply of money leads to an 
increase in the price of money: more units of a good than 
26. My reconstruction of the role of speculation in Reid’s wheat market 
example is based on the discussion of speculation in Murray N. 
Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles, 
2nd ed. (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2004), 130–37. 
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before are needed to buy a unit of money. That means, in 
different terms, that a unit of money can buy more units 
of a good than before. In short, the money prices of goods 
diminish. Hume then famously proceeds to show how, in 
an open international market, higher prices at home will 
make the money leave the country to chase cheaper for-
eign products, eventually reestablishing the old equilib-
rium between money and commodities. Lower prices at 
home, on the other hand, will attract foreign buyers and 
bring back the money to the old ratio.27 In this famous 
analysis of the specie-flow mechanism of the balance of 
trade, there is no mention of the effect that expectations 
about the future may have, a point that can be found, at 
least according to Nagao, in Reid’s wheat market exam-
ple.28 
27. See David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. 
Miller (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1985), 308–26. 
28. According to Murray N. Rothbard, one of the flaws of Hume’s 
analysis of money “was his propensity picked up and magnified by 
Smith, Ricardo, and the classical school, for leaping from one long-
run equilibrium state to another, without bothering about the dynamic 
process through time by which the real world actually moves from one 
state to another. It is this brusque neglect (or ‘comparative statics’) that 
leads Hume to omit the Cantillonian analysis of micro-changes in cash 
balances and income, and that causes him to neglect income effects in 
the price-specie flow mechanism of international monetary adjustment” 
(Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Thought before Adam Smith: An Austrian 
Perspective in the History of Economic Thought, Volume 1 [Auburn, AL.: 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006], 428). It is beyond the scope of this 
essay to assess the truth of the particular claims made by Rothbard: 
we are here only noticing that a neglect of the role played by opinions 
or expectations in price formation would be compatible with an 
exclusive focus on long-run equilibrium. A very detailed discussion of 
the problems raised by trying to distinguish the long-run and short-
run effects ensuing respectively from the specie-flow mechanism and 
the sudden injection of cash from abroad can be found in Margaret 
Schabas, “Temporal Dimensions in Hume’s Monetary Theory,” in David 
Hume’s Political Economy, ed. Carl Wennerlind and Margaret Schabas 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 127–45. Schabas also tries to determine 
whether Hume may have had some awareness of the role of arbitragers 
in eliminating price differentials (see Schabas, “Temporal Dimensions 
in Hume’s Monetary Theory,” 141). 
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4.4. Inventory and the Mechanism of Supply and Demand
As I pointed out earlier, Reid does not discuss explicitly 
the role of expectations in relation to the wheat market 
example, but he does mention the role of inventory. Once 
seen in this context, the point that he makes is perfectly 
consistent with the laws of supply and demand. As a mat-
ter of fact, it turns out to be an explanation of how the laws 
of supply and demand actually work in particular cases.
Reid claims that changes in the price of commodities 
are not in the simple proportion of changes in supply and 
demand: “The Increase or Decrease of the price of Com-
modities is not alwise [sic] in the Simple proportion of the 
Causes above mentioned but Commonly as I apprehend in 
a Greater.”29 Reid then goes on to present the two cases we 
have seen: a reduction in the supply of wheat from 10.000 
to 7.000 quarters increases prices much more than in the 
proportion of 7 to 10. An increase in supply from 10.000 
to 15.000 quarters brings down prices much more than in 
the proportion of 15 to 10. 
While the laws of supply and demand predict that 
prices will fall or rise in relation to changes in supply and 
demand, they do not tell us anything about the precise 
proportions between price changes and changes in supply 
and demand. These depend on the particular supply and 
demand schedules for particular commodities at particu-
lar times and in particular circumstances. 
Consider Reid’s second case, the fall of the price of a 
commodity due to an increase in its supply. Let’s imag-
ine that the supply of two kinds of goods having the same 
price, A and B, doubles. Good A can only be destroyed or 
stored at a great cost while good B can be stored easily 
at a low cost. Then the price of A will fall more than the 
price of B. Moreover, at different times and in different 
circumstances, sellers may have different supply sched-
ules about the same type of good A. For example, in one 
market, sellers are “opulent” and will not sell good A below 
29. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fol. 2r. 
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a certain price while, in another market, sellers are not 
“opulent” and therefore are more willing to sell good A at a 
lower price. The same increase of supply of the same com-
modity A in the first circumstance will not bring down the 
price as much as in the latter circumstance.30 In Reid’s 
terms,
If the Commodity be such as will not keep to another year or 
if the Sellers are in such Circumstances as that they cannot 
keep it, It must be sold at any Rate & the price will fall one 
half or perhaps more. But if the Corn will keep to another 
Year & the Sellers in Opulent Circumstances & furnished 
with Conveniences, they will keep up the price nearly in 
proportion to the Natural Value. And this will be more easy 
if the Buyers have also ability & convenience to buy & keep 
it for one or More Years.31 
Reid then proceeds to draw two general lessons. The first 
lesson is about shifts in the supply and demand schedules 
of goods that can be stored: in this case, it is the nature 
itself of a commodity that determines the particular way 
its price responds to changes in supply and demand. The 
second lesson is about the difference that the “opulence” 
and skills in “management” of sellers and buyers make to 
the supply and demand schedules of a good: in this case, 
circumstances about the actors in the market determine 
the way price responds to changes in supply and demand. 
Reid continues:
18. Hence, it is obvious that Commodities that may be long 
kept do not rise or fall in their prices so much in proportion 
to the Causes above mentioned as those which cannot be 
long kept.
30. In the first case, the supply curve is bent more toward the horizontal 
axis: if the demand curve remains the same, a shift to the right of the 
supply curve (i.e., an increase of supply) will not lower the price to a 
great extent. In the second case, the supply curve is bent more toward 
the vertical axis: if the demand curve remains the same, a shift to the 
right of the supply curve will lower the price to a greater extent. 
31. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fols. 2r–2v. 
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19. It is likewise Evident that the Opulence of the Buyers 
& Sellers & their Accomodations for Store are a Means of 
preventing the fall or Rise of Commodities that may be kept.
20. Vice versa, a great Rise or fall of such Commodities as 
are mentioned in the last article above or below their Natural 
Value is an Indication of Poverty or Bad Management in the 
Dealers that suffer by it.32 
Reid here explicitly speaks of a departure from the “nat-
ural value” of a commodity, where natural value is deter-
mined by the cost of labor, or, in more general terms, the 
cost of production. In general, changes in either supply 
or demand make the price of a commodity depart from its 
natural price. However, in the case of commodities that 
may be kept in storage, changes in supply and demand 
may not cause a significant rise or fall from price as deter-
mined by natural value (points 18 and 19 in the quotation 
above). Various factors, then, affect the precise way the 
equilibrium based on supply and demand is determined: 
(1) the nature of the commodity, in particular, whether it 
may be stored or not; (2) if the commodity can be stored, 
the actual ability or inability of buyers and sellers to store 
it (“the Accomodations made for Store” together with what 
looks like their opposite, the “Bad Management in the 
Dealers”); and (3) the “Opulence” or “Poverty” of the sellers 
and buyers.33 
Given these circumstances, it may then turn out that an 
increase in supply or reduction in demand of a commod-
ity that can be stored may not cause a significant fall from 
the natural price as determined by cost of production. In 
its turn, a reduction in supply or increase in demand of a 
commodity that can be stored may not cause a significant 
rise in price above the natural price as determined by cost 
of production. More precisely, Reid may have thought that, 
in the case of commodities that can be stored, various 
32. Ibid., fol. 2v. 
33. The opulence of sellers and buyers is a circumstance that may affect 
their ability to store the commodity. 
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scenarios may occur that prevent a significant rise or fall 
of the price from an antecedent price level. We can try to 
reconstruct what Reid had in mind and distinguish six 
cases:
(1) An increase in the quantity produced (output) does 
not determine an increase in supply, since the surplus is 
stored by the sellers: thus the price remains the same as the 
previous one. 
(2) In the case of a reduced demand, the sellers reduce 
their supply (and store the quantity not supplied): the 
price-lowering effect of a reduced demand is counteracted 
by the price-raising effect of a lower supply and thus the 
sellers manage to keep the price close to the previous 
one. 
(3) In case of a lower supply, the buyers, who have stored 
the commodity, reduce their demand and consume the 
stored goods: the price-raising effect of a lower supply is 
counteracted by the price-lowering effect of a diminished 
demand and thus the buyers manage to keep the price close 
to the previous level. 
(4) In case of a higher demand, the sellers bring the stored 
goods to the market: the price-raising effect of an increase 
in demand is counteracted by the price-lowering effect of an 
increase in supply and thus the price does not change much 
from the previous level. 
(5) In case of an increase in supply, the buyers, who are 
opulent and have made accommodations for store, increase 
their demand: the price-lowering effect of an increase of 
supply is counteracted by the price-raising effect of an 
increase of demand and thus the price does not change 
much from the previous level. 
(6) A higher consumption among buyers does not cause a 
higher demand, since the buyers are consuming the goods 
they have stored in the past: the price remains the same as 
the previous one. 
In all these cases, markets clear at the point of equilib-
rium between demand and supply. Whatever part of goods 
remains in the inventory of either the sellers or the buy-
ers does not come to the market and so, strictly speak-
ing, is neither supplied nor demanded. Thus, there are no 
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shortages or surpluses: the buyers manage to buy all the 
goods they were willing to buy at that price, and the sell-
ers manage to sell all the goods they were willing to sell at 
that price. The equilibrium price would remain roughly the 
same as the original one (and exactly identical in cases 1 
and 6). The equilibrium quantity of goods sold and bought 
will be (a) the same as the original quantity in cases 1 and 
6, (b) smaller than the original one in cases 2 and 3, and 
(c) larger than the original one in cases 4 and 5.34 
We can also notice that in the case of goods that can 
be stored, cases 1 and 6 may occur: (1) a higher out-
put by itself does not bring about a higher supply, and 
(6) a higher consumption by itself does not bring about a 
higher demand. In describing the operation of supply and 
demand in price formation, Reid speaks explicitly of an 
increase and decrease of demand, but, in the case of sup-
ply, he uses more ambiguous expressions: “increase” or 
“decrease” of the commodity. These expressions may refer 
34. According to Nagao, inventory would either (1) keep the price “higher 
than market equilibrium” or (2) “stop the unnecessary decrease of prices 
below equilibrium.” In Nagao’s reconstruction, the term “equilibrium” 
stands for “natural price”; that is, equilibrium as determined by the cost 
of production. In the short run, the sellers, by withholding the good they 
have produced, can sell it for a price higher than the one approximating 
the cost of production (the demand remaining the same as before): in 
this case, the price is determined by equilibrium of supply and demand, 
but this price could be much higher than cost of production. Inventory 
also prevents “an unnecessary decrease of prices below equilibrium.” 
Presumably, the decrease from natural price equilibrium would be 
“unnecessary,” in the sense that it is not desirable for the survival of 
the firm, since the total cost of production has not gone down at the 
same time. It is not clear what scenarios Nagao envisions. It may be the 
case of a reduced demand, where the sellers, by withholding the good 
from the market, can keep the price from falling below the previous 
equilibrium level. However, since the sellers would sell fewer units of the 
good than before, they would probably not be able to cover the costs of 
production. Or it may be the case of a reduced supply unaccompanied 
by a reduction in the total cost of production (and this would amount 
to an actual increase of the cost of production per unit of good). In 
this case, an increase in demand from the previous level may keep up 
the price to the previous level and may save the firm from failure (see 
Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 29–30). 
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simply to the increase or decrease of quantity produced 
(that is, the output). An increase or decrease of output 
does not always lead to an increase or decrease of sup-
ply, as we have seen in the case of storable goods. In a 
similar manner, Reid may have used the term “demand” 
somewhat ambiguously: what is now called demand pre-
supposes the willingness and ability on the part of buyers 
to spend certain amounts of money for certain quantities 
of a commodity. Reid may still have confused this notion 
with the simple desire for the commodity. An increase in 
demand, understood as a mere increase of the desire to 
consume more of a commodity, does not always translate 
into a willingness and ability to buy certain quantities of a 
good at certain prices, as can be seen in case 6, above: in 
that case, an increase in the desire for a commodity leads 
to an increase in the consumption of the stored commodity 
without changes in the demand schedule of the buyers.35 
To sum up, once properly understood, the case of storable 
goods does not involve any shortage or surplus, and thus 
any failure of the markets to satisfy demand or allocate 
supply: markets clear at the equilibrium point of supply 
and demand. What is clear in Reid’s text, and Nagao points 
this out in his article, is a distinction between short-term 
equilibrium, where markets adjust to variations in supply 
and demand, and long-term equilibrium, which is based 
on the cost of production.36 Reid describes how the supply 
35. Consider another instance of difference between desire and demand: 
a poor person may strongly desire to consume some good without at 
the same time being willing and able to pay anything for it. In this case, 
there would be an unsatisfied desire but no unsatisfied demand. The 
paradigmatic case of unsatisfied demand is a shortage brought about 
by a price ceiling imposed by the government: a certain quantity of a 
good is offered at a certain price imposed by the government, but not 
enough quantity can be supplied to meet the demand of all people who 
want to buy the good at that price. 
36. See Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 30. Nagao also considers 
another case where the seller, by storing the commodity, makes the 
price go above the natural price. Reid mentions the case of a tax levied 
on glass. In this case, the price set by the seller was above the rate 
of increase in the seller’s expense as determined by the tax. This can 
happen for two reasons: (1) the seller represents the tax increase as 
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schedule and the demand schedule are actually formed 
in real markets and therefore how market-clearing prices 
are formed in the short run. In describing the mechanisms 
of supply and demand, he is aware that various factors 
determine what the supply schedule of the sellers and the 
demand schedule of the buyers will be. He remains confi-
dent, however, that price in the long run is determined by 
natural value: “When Commodities by any of the Causes 
Mentioned are raised above or brought below their Natural 
Value they have still a tendency to return to it in the Natu-
ral Course of Things.”37 For example, if the sellers decide to 
being heavier than it is in order to increase the profit margin; (2) the 
seller withholds some of the goods foreseeing a drop in demand among 
buyers as a result of the price increase caused by the tax itself (so this 
is an instance of a wrong expectation about the size of the demand). 
Thus, by withholding the good, the seller eventually sends the price 
higher than the expense incurred because of the tax. Nagao includes 
this case in the section about inventory, as an example of how both 
expectations and inventory lead to “an unnecessary reduction in 
supply” and “a superfluous growth in demand” (see AUL MS 2131/4/
III/15, fol. 2v, and Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 29). But if this 
case is construed as a failure of markets, then the government that 
introduced the tax should be held responsible for it. 
37. AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fol. 2v. Nagao notices that this description 
of the price mechanism is “expressed in exactly the same phrase as 
Smith’s” (Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 24). In the remainder of the 
manuscript, Reid goes on to enumerate other factors that affect prices, 
beside natural value and the mechanisms of supply and demand. He is 
confident, however, that price in the long run is determined by natural 
value. See Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 29–30, for Reid’s complete 
list of factors affecting prices. According to Nagao, Reid’s papers include 
the following factors: (1) changes in demand and supply; (2) taxation; (3) 
changes in the living expenses of workers, including ones from cultural 
reasons; (4) the role of expectations; and (5) the amount of liquidity 
accessible to sellers and buyers (what Reid calls “opulence”). We have 
seen how factors 4 and 5 are either compatible with or reducible to 
factor 1, changes in demand and supply. On Reid’s price theory, see 
also AUL MSS 2131/4/III/4, 2131/4/III/10, and 2131/4/III/17 (MSS 
2131/4/III/4 and 2131/4/III/17 have been published in Reid, Practical 
Ethics, 160–66). From these manuscripts, it appears that Reid, while 
endorsing the labor theory of value, rejects the view that there is an 
objective and permanent measure of labor. In this regard, Haakonssen 
observes that “Reid’s attempt to combine a traditional subjective 
analysis of the concept of value with a labor concept of the measure of 
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withhold part of the output and reduce their supply, they 
can raise the price of their commodity well above the price 
determined by the cost of production. This would be the 
short-term effect of a reduced supply, provided the demand 
remains the same as before. But, in an open economy with 
movements of capital among various sectors, competitors 
will eventually enter the market for that commodity: the 
supply will increase and the price will tend to fall back to a 
level approximating the cost of production.
5. The Love of Riches in Hume and Reid
As Nagao himself has shown, Reid’s manuscripts can be 
read as simply pointing to the temporary deviations from 
the natural price that eventually obtains: as we have seen, 
Reid explicitly claims that eventually the natural price pre-
vails. Nor do we find any reference to market failure as a 
justification for government intervention in Reid’s paper 
on the utopian system of government.38 
Reid’s papers, to be sure, bear witness to his inclination 
to advocate government interventions and regulations in 
various sectors of the economy.39 But beyond the economic 
value should be compared with Adam Smith’s famous and controversial 
attempt in the same direction” (Reid, Practical Ethics, 350n108). Thus 
factor 3—changes in the living expenses of the workers, including ones 
from cultural reasons—is part and parcel of Reid’s labor theory of value: 
the natural price of a commodity reflects the price of labor. This is still 
a money price, and it can change according to the different historical 
conditions of society, including the mutable opinions about the tenor of 
life that certain categories of workers are expected to have. 
38. Reid, however, is confident about the economic superiority of the 
utopian system. By keeping registers of what is produced and consumed, 
the government would be able to allocate scarce resources in a more 
efficient manner than in a society where production and distribution is 
left to the free initiative of individuals (see Reid, Practical Ethics, 294–
95). 
39. Two questions discussed by Reid for the Aberdeen Philosophical 
Society include several examples of policy recommendations to the 
government. See AUL MS 2131/6/I/13, “What are the Best Expedients 
for preventing an extravagant rise of Servants’ Wages & for obliging 
them to bestow their labour when Agriculture and Manufactures require 
it” (12 January 1762), and AUL MS 2131/2/II/17, “Whether By proper 
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reasons that might have made Reid suspicious of commer-
cial society, there are more fundamental reasons for his 
distaste: these are his views on moral psychology. Here, 
the comparison with Hume is enlightening.
In the classic liberal tradition, it is not unusual to defend 
a free market system either by showing that such an order 
respects the fundamental rights of every person (in par-
ticular, property rights) or by showing that this is the best 
system for bringing about the greatest material prosper-
ity for the greatest number of people. But these consid-
erations do not seem to be central to Hume’s defense of 
commercial society. In the essay on commerce, a compari-
son is drawn with ancient polities. These states were able 
to rely on the martial spirit and the sense of civic duty 
of their citizens for their defense and expansion. Hume 
defends modern commercial society by arguing that its 
higher efficiency can be exploited by the state for its own 
goals. In case of war, fully employed factors of production 
that would remain idle in a poorer society can be diverted 
to war. Even in times of peace, the higher prosperity of civil 
society can be exploited by the state through taxation. So 
it seems that what is great about trade and manufacture 
is that they provide a larger tax base on which the state 
can draw.40 
Along with this political justification of commercial soci-
ety, we find a moral justification. Commerce, so Hume 
argues, makes people more industrious and frugal. Hume’s 
accent is not only on the material prosperity that the exer-
cise of these virtues brings about.41 Hume also claims that 
the increase of industry, characteristic of the new commer-
cial society, eventually leads to an increase of knowledge 
and humanity among people.42 Whereas Hume’s approval 
Laws the number of Births in every parish might not be doubled, or at 
least greatly increased?” (8 June 1762). 
40. See Hume, Essays, 253–67 and 272. 
41. Ibid., 301. 
42. The demand for “luxury” goods in commercial societies brings about 
a general increase in industry, knowledge, and humanity among people 
(see Hume, Essays, 270–71). 
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of frugality is qualified—too much frugality would thwart 
the incentive to work harder in order to get rich—he gives 
the impression of approving of industry as a superior moral 
trait, no matter what its consequences may be.43
Eugene Rotwein, in his study of Hume’s economic psy-
chology, has drawn a comparison with other cases, on the 
basis of which he thinks Hume could understand the “love 
of riches” that animates the merchant and, more gener-
ally, the capitalist entrepreneur.44 
Hume first considers riches in the context of his analysis 
of the indirect passions of pride and humility in Book 2 of 
the Treatise of Human Nature. Here, the desire of riches is 
seen as a species of the desire of power: “Now riches are 
to be consider’d as the power of acquiring the property 
of what pleases; and ’tis only in this view they have any 
influence on the passions”45 What pleases, by being asso-
ciated to one person by the relation of property, eventually 
causes the passion of pride by the mechanism of double 
association of ideas and impressions. Hence, power, as a 
43. While Hume’s approval of industry and condemnation of indolence are 
a constant feature of his writings, the approval of frugality is qualified: in 
one essay, “Of Interest,” he paired frugality and industry as characteristic 
virtues of the merchant; other industrious professions—he mentions 
lawyers and physicians—beget frugality in their practitioners, but only 
merchants beget industry “by serving as canals to convey it through 
every corner of the state” (Essays, 301). In other terms, merchants make 
everybody more industrious, either directly by providing employment 
to people or indirectly by giving an incentive to people to work harder 
in order to produce commodities than can be bought. Thus, a certain 
degree of demand for “luxury” goods is an incentive to industry among 
people. By their frugality, merchants acquire power over that industry 
and accumulate large stocks of money. On the contrary, the excessive 
“prodigality and expence” of the old landed gentry prevented the 
accumulation of capital (see Essays, 301–2). On the centrality of the 
concept of industry (“diligent, systematic, intelligent labor”) in Hume, 
see Carl Wennerlind, “The Role of Political Economy in Hume’s Moral 
Philosophy,” Hume Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 43–64. 
44. See David Hume, Writings on Economics, ed. Eugene Rotwein (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), xxxii–liii. 
45. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and 
Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), bk. 2, pt. 1, 
sec. 10, on p. 203. 
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means of acquiring the property of an object, can produce 
effects that are similar to the actual property of the object: 
some kind of pleasure similar to the pleasure derived from 
the object and the indirect passion of pride. The miser feels 
happy at the possession of money, even if he never actu-
ally gets to spend the money on things that can give him 
pleasure. As long as he imagines that he can always spend 
the money to acquire what pleases him, he will be happy: 
A miser receives delight from his money; that is, from the 
power it affords him of procuring all the pleasures and 
conveniences of life, tho’ he knows he has enjoy’d his 
riches for forty years without ever employing them; and 
consequently cannot conclude by any species of reasoning, 
that the real existence of these pleasures is nearer, than 
if he were entirely depriv’d of all his possessions. But tho’ 
he cannot form any such conclusion in a way of reasoning 
concerning the nearer approach of the pleasure, ’tis certain 
he imagines it to approach nearer, whenever all external 
obstacles are remov’d, along with the more powerful motives 
of interest and danger, which oppose it.46
However, the miser who hoards money, who never spends 
nor lends to anybody, is different from the capitalist entre-
preneur who spends money (or lends it at interest) in order 
to gain more money than what he has now.47 In order to 
explain the peculiar psychology of the capitalist entrepre-
neur, Rotwein considers the section “Of curiosity, or the 
love of truth,” in part 3, book 2, of the Treatise. Here Hume 
argues that a philosopher’s or scientist’s48 ultimate goal, 
knowledge, just sets the passion for learning in motion, 
but what really seems to give enjoyment is the exercise of 
genius, the difficulty of the process of learning.49 
46. Ibid., bk. 2, pt. 1, sec. 10, on pp. 204–5. 
47. Hoarding may have an indirect beneficial effect on the economy by 
diminishing the quantity of money in circulation and thereby lowering 
prices: see, below, section 6. 
48. The term “philosopher” used by Hume includes the “natural philoso-
pher,” as was common at the time. 
49. In Hume’s terminology, a direct passion, the desire of an object, 
seems ultimately to produce a desire for the action that usually brings 
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The experience described by Hume is a familiar one: what 
really excites the philosopher or scientist is the search after 
truth, rather than the ultimate possession of truth and its 
utility. One would not find as much satisfaction in get-
ting to know from somebody else the solution to a difficult 
problem as in finding it by oneself. In a similar way, Hume 
says, what makes hunting interesting is not so much the 
about the object. The vivacity of one passion gets transferred to, or 
drained into, an associated passion. The process is facilitated by the 
fact that action, in general, is enjoyable, insofar as it “quickens” and 
“enlivens” the spirits. It may also be argued that the desire for action 
is primary and the desire for the end merely plays an instrumental 
role. In this regard, Rotwein distinguishes two different interpretations 
of avarice or the desire for gain. One interpretation makes the desire 
to acquire money depend on the association that money has with the 
pleasures it can buy. A different interpretation links the desire for gain 
“not to the desire for pleasure but rather to the pursuit of ‘lucrative 
employment’ qua action” (Hume, Writings on Economics, xlv). The desire 
for action would be primary, and the desire for wealth would be merely 
“an instrumental end.” As Rotwein claims, “[T]he fundamental motive 
here at work is the desire for action, while the desire for the apparent 
‘end’ is but an ‘image’ of the passion” (Hume, Writings on Economics, 
xlv). Rotwein refers to the parallel drawn by Hume between the love of 
truth and the love of hunting. Hume says that the utility or importance 
of the end pursued “causes no real passion, but is only requisite to sup-
port the imagination; and the same person, who over-looks a ten times 
greater profit in any other subject, is pleased to bring home half a doz-
en woodcocks or plovers, after having employ’d several hours in hunt-
ing after them” (Hume, Treatise, bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. 10, on pp. 288–89). 
However, as Rotwein points out, Hume thinks that we may eventually 
acquire an interest in the end insofar as it is “a token of the action suc-
cessfully consummated” (Hume, Writings on Economics, xlvi). Rotwein 
quotes this passage by Hume: “To make the parallel betwixt hunting 
and philosophy more compleat, we may observe, that tho’ in both cases 
the end of our action may in itself be despis’d, yet in the heat of action 
we acquire such an attention to this end, that we are uneasy under any 
disappointments, and are sorry when we either miss our game, or fall 
into any error of reasoning” (Hume, Treatise, bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. 10, on p. 
289). A few paragraphs before, Hume makes the general point on which 
this remark depends: “[W]here the mind pursues any end with passion; 
tho’ that passion be not deriv’d from the end, but merely from the ac-
tion and pursuit; yet by the natural course of affections, we acquire a 
concern for the end itself, and are uneasy under any disappointment 
we meet with in the pursuit of it” (Hume, Treatise, bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. 10, 
on p. 288). 
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object pursued. What makes hunting exciting is precisely 
the difficulty of it. However, the idea of utility of the object 
pursued remains important, since the hunter, so Hume 
thinks, would not engage in the pursuit if he knew that 
partridges and pheasants are of no use to anybody:
’Tis evident, that the pleasure of hunting consists in the 
action of the mind and body; the motion, the attention, the 
difficulty, and the uncertainty. ’Tis evident likewise, that 
these actions must be attended with an idea of utility, in 
order to their having any effect upon us. A man of the greatest 
fortune, and the farthest remov’d from avarice, tho’ he takes 
a pleasure in hunting after partridges and pheasants, feels 
no satisfaction in shooting crows or magpies; and that 
because he considers the first as fit for the table, and the 
other as entirely useless.50
In a similar manner, the idea of truth fixes the attention 
of the philosophers and scientists. As Hume remarks,
The truth we discover must also be of some importance. 
’Tis easy to multiply algebraical problems to infinity, nor is 
there any end in the discovery of the proportions of conic 
sections; tho’ few mathematicians take any pleasure in 
these researches, but turn their thoughts to what is more 
useful and important.51
A similar psychological mechanism is at work in gaming, 
and by extension, as Rotwein thinks, can be seen at work in 
the activity of the merchant and the capitalist entrepreneur. 
What is remarkable about this mechanism is that the 
interest in the goal that is pursued gives way to an inter-
est in the action. At the same time, the interest in the 
action can only be sustained by the idea of the utility of 
the object pursued. Greed eventually leads to industry and 
frugality, which are required to multiply riches. These, by 
way of capital accumulation, benefit all society. Thus, the 
industrious and frugal merchant is neither a miser nor a 
50. Hume, Treatise, bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. 10, on p. 288. 
51. Ibid., bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. 10, on p. 287. 
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simple lover of luxury: he neither simply subtracts money 
from circulation by hoarding it nor spends what he earns 
for mere consumption; rather, he reinvest it to earn more 
(although he would not derive any satisfaction if he were 
told that the money he earns is not real and could not 
purchase anything). The love of pleasure gives way in the 
merchant to the love of gain.52 But the love of gain of the 
merchant is different from the love of gain of the miser. In 
the merchant, the love of gain becomes “love of the game.” 
At the same time, the merchant’s industry and frugality 
are sustained by an idea of the utility of the object pur-
sued. The love of the game of the merchant is thus also dif-
ferent from the love of the game of the person who wastes 
time in difficult but ultimately useless pursuits. 
Hume then sees this way out of the usual accusation of 
greed leveled against the character of the merchant. He 
can do so because the associative psychological mecha-
nisms that he recognizes allow, so to speak, the transmu-
tation of base metals into gold.53
52. Hume says, “It is an infallible consequence of all industrious profes-
sions, to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love 
of pleasure” (Essays, 301). As we have seen, according to Hume, while 
other professions beget frugality, only commerce begets both industry 
and frugality (see n. 43, above). Till Grüne-Yanoff and Edward F. Mc-
Clennen argue that “Hume in fact takes a more ambivalent position 
regarding the love of gain, in that he allows that, in certain cases, it may 
prove to be most disruptive” (Till Grüne-Yanoff and Edward F. McClen-
nen, “Hume’s Framework for a Natural History of Passions,” in Wenne-
rlind and Schabas, David Hume’s Political Economy, 95–96). They refer 
to this passage in the Treatise: “All the other passions, besides this of 
interest, are either easily restrain’d, or are not of such pernicious con-
sequences when indulg’d [. . .] This avidity alone, of acquiring goods 
and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, 
perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society” (Hume, Trea-
tise, bk. 3, pt. 2, sec. 2, on p. 316). Hume also condemns avarice in 
the unpublished essay “Of Avarice” (see Essays, 569–73). On Hume’s 
economic psychology, see also Margaret Schabas, “Hume on Economic 
Well-Being,” in The Continuum Companion to Hume, ed. Dan O’Brien 
and Alan Bailey (London: Continuum, 2012), 332–48. 
53. Harro Maas explicitly connects Reid’s statism to dualism and the 
rejection of mechanisms that would account for spontaneous emer-
gence of order out of self-interest (Harro Maas, “Where Mechanism 
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But, according to Reid, what is wrong about the mer-
chant and the entrepreneur is precisely that they do not 
spend their money to buy things they can use directly for 
their own or other people’s consumption. In the Essays 
on the Active Powers of Man, Reid describes the love of 
money as an acquired desire. Originally, the love of money 
is merely a species of the love of power, and the love of 
power is a natural desire, along with the love of knowledge 
and the love of esteem. These natural desires are gener-
ally useful to society (even the love of power when prop-
erly directed). Power can be either good or bad according 
to the end we propose. In a similar fashion, money is not 
good in itself, but only for what it can buy. The conversion 
of power as a means into an ultimate end is a perversion 
of the natural desire for power. The miser who hoards up 
money is to be condemned because he takes the means 
to be an end in itself.54 But Reid seems not to appreciate 
Ends: Thomas Reid on the Moral and the Animal Oeconomy,” History 
of Political Economy 35, annual supplement [2003]: 338–60). 
54. See Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, essay 3, pt. 2, chap. 2, 
on pp. 105–6. According to Reid, we naturally desire power for its own 
sake, and not simply with a view to any advantage to us that power 
might bring about. Thus, the natural desire of power is not a selfish 
desire and, in itself, is neither vicious nor virtuous. There is a degree in 
the desire for power that is “natural” and not blameworthy. Reid seems 
to imply that, so long as the desire of power is subordinated to higher 
principles of action, it will be kept to its proper and natural degree. Reid 
explains that the desire for money becomes a principle of action only 
when money is sought for its own sake rather than for the things it can 
procure. As Reid says, “Being useful for many different purposes as the 
means, some men lose sight of the end, and terminate their desire upon 
the means.” He goes on to say that “[m]oney is also a species of power, 
putting a man in a condition to do many things which he could not do 
without it; and power is a natural object of desire, even when it is not 
exercised.” In the same way, a man may acquire “the desire of a title of 
honour, of an equipage, of an estate.” Given that, after all, money is a 
species of power, and that power is a natural object of desire, it would 
seem to follow that money could be legitimately desired for its own sake 
insofar as it is a species of power (provided that this desire is not exces-
sive and is kept within its proper bounds). Reid does not spell out this 
thought. Rather, he reiterates that “acquired desires are not only use-
less, but hurtful and even disgraceful.” One way to keep the desire for 
money within its proper bounds would be by reference to the ends that 
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the peculiar figure of the merchant. The merchant does 
not simply hoard money: the merchant spends money in 
order to make more money (money that he would then 
reinvest). But for Reid, this ultimate goal taints the moral 
character of the merchant. Rather than to rely on the love 
of money to make society better, we should rely on the love 
of esteem, which is naturally more allied to virtue than 
the love of power. Instead of the love of money as a spur 
to industry, we should have badges of honor conferred by 
our superior officers. 
6. Hume on Paper Credit
In the previous section, we have seen that Hume and Reid 
had a different understanding of the love of riches that 
animates the merchant and, as a consequence, had a dif-
ferent opinion about the value of the emerging commercial 
society. However, we should be wary of drawing from this 
analysis facile inferences about their respective positions 
on particular issues of economic policy. 
Among the various eighteenth-century debates on eco-
nomic policies, a particularly contentious issue was that 
of paper money. In the next three sections, I will try to 
give an account of Hume’s and Reid’s views on this issue: 
they will turn out to be not too distant in the end. In 
general, Hume disapproved of paper money, whether in 
the form of paper credit, bank credit, or public credit. 55 
are served by money: “To love money, titles or equipage, on any other 
account than as they are useful or ornamental, is allowed by all to be 
weakness and folly” (Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, essay 3, 
pt. 2, chap.. 2, on p. 105). 
55. Maria Pia Paganelli refers to James Steuart’s An Inquiry into the Prin-
ciples of Political Economy (1767), for a detailed account of the three 
forms of paper money available in Hume’s time (Maria Pia Paganelli, 
“David Hume on Monetary Policy: A Retrospective Approach,” Journal 
of Scottish Philosophy 7, no. 1 [2009]: 73 and 84n12). Carl Wennerlind 
distinguishes between privately issued paper money, such as bills of ex-
change and bank credit, and state-issued paper money, “more precise-
ly, securities backed by national debt.” Hume endorsed “fully backed 
paper-credit,” but “he did not endorse the practice of using this form of 
money to expand the overall money stock.” Although Hume recognizes 
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However, he appears to have become relatively more favor-
able to some form of paper money in later editions of his 
Essays. Reid appears to have been a strong supporter 
of paper credit in comments on a question proposed by 
David Skene for a meeting of the Aberdeen Philosophi-
cal Society. In his lectures in Glasgow, Reid appears to 
have been in favor of hard money while recognizing some 
of the advantages of paper money. We will begin by out-
lining the main features of Hume’s views on money.
As Maria Pia Paganelli has pointed out in her essay 
on Hume’s monetary policy, two elements characterize 
Hume’s notion of money. (1) Money is whatever is vol-
untarily accepted as a medium of exchange: in Hume’s 
words, money is “only the instrument which men have 
agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity 
for another.”56 Thus, Hume’s notion of money is differ-
ent from our contemporary notion of fiat money, “uncon-
vertible and unbacked paper money” that is imposed by 
the state as legal tender (that is, as the unique form of 
money that should be accepted as payment).57 (2) Hume 
some of the benefits of state-issued paper money backed by national 
debt, he “ultimately opposes this form of paper money.” Even if this 
money is backed by a security, “this security does not provide a built-in 
discipline, since the national debt is likely to spiral our control” (Carl 
Wennerlind, “An Artificial Virtue and the Oil of Commerce: A Synthetic 
View of Hume’s Theory of Money,” in Wennerlind and Schabas, David 
Hume’s Political Economy, 113–14). See also Carl Wennerlind, “David 
Hume’s Monetary Theory Revisited: Was He Really a Quantity Theorist 
and an Inflationist?” Journal of Political Economy 113, no. 1 (2005): 
235. It is not always clear in Reid’s and Hume’s references to paper 
money whether they are merely talking about money substitutes, that 
is, claims that are payable on demand in real specie money and are per-
fectly secure (100 percent convertible), or they are talking about forms 
of credit money, that is, claims that are not payable on demand and are 
not perfectly secure. The practice of fractional reserve banking expands 
the money supply beyond the current stock of money and therefore 
results in the creation of a form of credit money. On the distinction 
between commodity money, money substitutes, credit money, and fiat 
money, see Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit, trans. 
H. E. Bateson (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1980), 73–76. 
56. Hume, Essays, 281. 
57. Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary Policy,” 66–67. Paganelli points out 
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that Hume followed the view, common in the mid-eighteenth century, 
according to which money is “a sign of all commodities in the world” and, 
more precisely, a measure of their value. Exchange was still not seen 
as resulting merely from the inequality of subjective values; rather, it 
was seen in the way described by Aristotle in book 5 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, as the exchange of two goods having the same objective value: 
“Given the difference in goods, the consequent difficulties in comparing 
and equating things of different values, and the requirement of equality 
to exchange, a ‘measure of everything’ is needed [. . .]. A physical com-
modity—traditionally, but not exclusively and not necessarily, precious 
metals—is conventionally introduced as money to compare the most 
diverse goods and to be exchanged for any good” (Paganelli, “Hume on 
Monetary Policy,” 68). Thus, it appears that something can eventually 
work as a universal medium of exchange only because it is accepted as 
a universal measure of value for all the commodities that are to be ex-
changed. Speaking from a modern standpoint, Ludwig von Mises thus 
explains the old view of money: “Although it is usual to speak of money 
as a measure of value and prices, the notion is entirely fallacious. So 
long as the subjective theory of value is accepted, this question of mea-
surement cannot arise. In the older political economy, the search for a 
principle governing the measurement of value was to a certain extent 
justifiable. If, in accordance with an objective theory of value, the pos-
sibility of an objective concept of commodity values is accepted, and 
exchange is regarded as the reciprocal surrender of equivalent goods, 
then the conclusion necessarily follows that exchange transactions 
must be preceded by measurement of the quantity of value contained in 
each of the objects that are to be exchanged. And it is then an obvious 
step to regard money as the measure of value” (Mises, Theory of Money 
and Credit, 51). According to Hume, “money is money because it is con-
ventionally accepted as such” (Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary Policy,” 
67). An object becomes money because it is conventionally accepted as 
a measure of value for all commodities and as a medium of exchange. 
The precise circumstances that give rise to such uses are variously 
described in the recent literature on Hume. At some point, Paganelli 
speaks of money as emerging in order to meet the need to overcome 
the double coincidence of wants present in barter (Paganelli, “Hume on 
Monetary Policy,” 67). Other interpreters stress the role of money in a 
universal system of deferred payments. If we describe money as solving 
the problem of the double coincidence of wants in a barter economy, 
then money allows me to trade what I own and you do not want (and a 
third party wants) for what I want and you do not own (and a third party 
owns). In the case of deferred payments, money would allow me to trade 
what I cannot deliver to you now and you want from me for something 
you can deliver to me now and I want from you. Money would then 
originate as a form of credit, as a symbol of a commitment to pay later 
in kind. According to Wennerlind, who refers to the account of promises 
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was familiar with two forms of money: real specie (precious 
metals) and paper money. According to Hume, only pre-
cious metals (gold and silver) enjoy the full status of money 
(although not all precious metals are money, but only those 
that are accepted in exchange for other commodities, that 
is, those in the form of coins). Precious metals enjoy the 
full status of money because they are universally “agreed 
upon” as a media of exchange and therefore as means of 
payment.58 Paper money, unlike precious metal money, 
in Treatise, book 3, part 2, section 5, Hume sees money as originating 
from “a convention [. . .] whereby people can signal their commitment to 
a system of deferred payments by using a standardized symbol. [. . .] [I]f 
an entire society agrees by convention to accept a symbol as a promis-
sory note and redeem it with property when presented, then the symbol 
acquires the capacity to mediate any conceivable transaction and thus 
operates as universal equivalent” (Wennerlind, “An Artificial Virtue and 
the Oil of Commerce,” 107). Schabas stresses the primary role that 
money has as a measure of value in Hume: “[T]he justification of mon-
ey replacing barter is not the problem of double coincidence of wants, 
but rather the preferability of a uniform measure of value as trade and 
industry become more ‘intricate’” (Schabas “Temporal Dimensions in 
Hume’s Monetary Theory,” 130). 
58. Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary Policy,” 67. Some interpreters seem 
to think that since money, according to Hume, is a conventional mea-
sure of value that allows us to equate commodities in an exchange 
and a symbol accepted as a promissory note in a system of deferred 
payments, then, in principle, objects of any material could serve as 
money. As Christopher J. Finlay observes, referring to Wennerlind’s 
work, “Hume understands money theoretically as a fiduciary curren-
cy. [. . .] [B]ecause money’s function is symbolic—representing value 
rather than embodying it intrinsically—its material substance may be 
theoretically unimportant” (Christopher J. Finlay, “Commerce and the 
Law of Nations in Hume’s Theory of Money,” in The Empire of Credit: 
The Financial Revolution in Britain, Ireland and America, 1688–1815, ed. 
Daniel Carey and Christopher J. Finlay [Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 
2011], 59). Hume’s preference for precious metals would be dictated by 
practical considerations: Hume was “a fiduciary theorist and practical 
metallist, rather than the theoretical metallist he is often thought to be” 
(Carl Wennerlind, “The Link between David Hume’s Treatise of Human 
Nature and His Fiduciary Theory of Money,” History of Political Economy 
33, no. 1 [2001]: 140). The limited supply of precious metals would en-
sure that money is not “multiplied without end” and thus that its value 
does not sink to nothing (see Hume’s letter to the abbé Morellet, in 
Hume, Writings on Economics, 214). Precious metals also happen to be 
accepted in transactions with foreign traders. Thus, the preference for 
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precious metals is a matter of monetary policy rather than of monetary 
theory. On the distinction between theoretical and practical metallism, 
see Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, ed. Elizabeth 
Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 288–89. 
Modern Austrian economists conceive money primarily as a medium 
that allows indirect exchange. According to this view, only commodities 
that were relatively more marketable than others could originally have 
come to be accepted as media of exchange. Things with little or no use 
value and in no demand could never have acquired exchange value 
and have come to be accepted as money. Many different commodities 
have been used as media of exchange at different times and in differ-
ent places. Precious metals were sought out only for their ornamental 
use before they came to be accepted as universal media of exchange. 
Factors contributing to their high marketability have been their great 
demand as ornaments, their scarcity in relation to other commodities, 
their divisibility into homogenous units, their durability and portabil-
ity (see Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 192; Carl Menger, Prin-
ciples of Economics [Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950], 257–71; and Mises, 
Theory of Money and Credit, 42–46). According to Austrian theorists, an 
account of the exchange value of money must ultimately make some 
reference to its original use value as a commodity in order to avoid an 
infinite regress in explanation (see Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, 
129–44; and Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 268–76). In a letter 
to the abbé Morellet, Hume acknowledges that “money must always 
be made of some materials, which have intrinsic value, otherwise it 
would be multiplied without end, and would sink to nothing” (letter to 
the abbé Morellet, in Hume, Writings on Economics, 214). However, he 
adds: “But when I take a shilling, I consider it not as a useful metal, 
but a something which another will take from me; and the person who 
shall convert it into metal is, probably, several million removes distant” 
(214). He lists examples of debased coins whose precious metal con-
tent is much below their nominal value: these pass as currency, a cir-
cumstance that “can arise only from tacit convention” (214). He further 
gives the example of sheep, oxen, and fish being used as money and 
of paper money backed by land in Pennsylvania. It is clear from these 
examples that, for Hume, money does not necessarily have to be made 
of precious metals. However, he appears to think that only a commod-
ity or something that is backed by a commodity (or something, at least, 
that looks like a commodity and is taken as such for the time being) 
can serve as money. Indeed, even the convention to accept debased 
coins emerges tacitly and requires as a background an original use of 
coins that are not debased. When Hume recommends that authorities 
increase the nominal value of coins rather than deflationary recoinage 
at full value, he implies that this debasement must be done more or less 
surreptitiously and in a small degree in order to “preserve the illusion” 
that no debasement really occurred (Hume, Essays, 287–88n7). In this 
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cannot travel abroad, since it is not accepted by foreign 
traders as payment. According to Hume, paper money is 
a “counterfeit money, which foreigners will not accept in 
any payment.”59 Hence, a widespread introduction of paper 
money will eventually drive out precious metal money from 
a country. Speaking of stocks in public credit, Hume says 
that “being a kind of paper-credit, [they] have all the dis-
advantages attending that species of money. They ban-
ish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce 
of the state, reduce them to common circulation, and by 
that means render all provisions and labour dearer than 
they would otherwise be.”60 As economists would later say, 
“[B]ad money drives out good money.”61 Hume explains the 
phenomenon in these terms:
I scarcely know any method of sinking money below its level, 
but those institutions of banks, funds, and paper-credit, 
which are so much practised in this kingdom. These render 
paper equivalent to money, circulate it throughout the 
whole state, make it supply the place of gold and silver, raise 
proportionably the price of labour and commodities, and 
by that means either banish a great part of those precious 
metals, or prevent their farther encrease.62 
By driving out money based in precious metals from the 
domestic economy, an increase in paper money will have 
an inflationary effect; thus, the proportion of paper money 
to specie, and to commodities will increase. People will bid 
up the prices in units of paper money they would accept 
in exchange of their goods and services. These prices are 
regard, C. George Caffentzis opposes metallic money as a natural fiction 
that is “arrived at unconsciously and universally through conventions” 
to paper money understood as an artificial fiction or counterfeit “arrived 
at consciously and particularly” and expressed as promises (C. George 
Caffentzis, “Fiction or Counterfeit? David Hume’s Interpretations of Pa-
per and Metallic Money,” in Wennerlind and Schabas, David Hume’s 
Political Economy, 150). 
59. Hume, Essays, 284. 
60. Ibid., 355. 
61. This is known as Gresham’s law. 
62. Hume, Essays, 316. 
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higher than the prices they would bid in exchange of units 
of real specie money. Labor and commodities will end up 
costing more, and that would be detrimental to the manu-
facturer and the merchant.63 The solution, as Hume saw 
it, was to establish a 100 percent gold and silver reserve 
bank so that all the paper money would be readily convert-
ible in real specie money.64 
Stimulus schemes based on paper money had been pro-
posed and experimented with during the eighteenth century. 
The most famous case is the scheme implemented by John 
Law (1671–1729) in France, during the regency period, after 
the death of Louis XIV. The Mississippi Company scheme led 
to runaway inflation and eventually to a debt crisis.65 
Hume’s plan for economic growth was different from any 
inflationary scheme based on paper money. As Pagan-
elli explains, hoarding real specie money, or, even better, 
converting it into silverware and jewelry, would naturally 
decrease the quantity of precious metals in circulation that 
are used as money. That would diminish the proportion 
of money to commodities, and therefore would sink their 
price at home.66 This, in its turn, would attract money from 
abroad that manufacturers could use to employ unused 
factors of production at home. In the interval between 
the acquisition of money and the rise in the price of com-
modities, the increasing quantity of money, passing from 
63. Ibid., 284. 
64. Ibid., 284–85. 
65. See Douglas E. French, Early Speculative Bubbles and Increases in 
the Supply of Money, 2nd ed. (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
2009), 51–74. Another famous inflationary scheme was the so-called 
South Sea Bubble (see French, Early Speculative Bubbles, 75–104). On 
public debt and new forms of credit emerging in the eighteenth century, 
see also the articles in Carey and Finlay, Empire of Credit, and Carl 
Wennerlind, The Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 
1620–1720 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
66. Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary Policy,” 74–81. According to Pagan-
elli, “The kind of hoarding that Hume seems to promote is done pri-
vately, and it is achieved through the alternative uses of precious met-
als” (Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary Policy,” 77). At some point, Hume 
condemns hoarding of money in a public treasure as destructive (see 
Hume, Essays, 320). 
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workmen to farmers, would be a spur to their productivi-
ty.67 Once wages and the price of commodities had caught 
up with each other, the operation of taking away money 
from the domestic economy could be repeated.68 
7. Skene’s Question on Paper Credit
While in Aberdeen, Reid wrote comments on a question pro-
posed by his friend David Skene (1731–70) for a meeting of 
the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, held on 24 February 
67. See Hume, Essays, 286–87. Paganelli refers to Hume’s proposal of a 
continuous annihilation of money in order to sink prices, favor sales, 
and keep the money coming back in (Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary 
Policy,” 77). This is a paradoxical way to make money increase by 
deflationary means. Wennerlind claims that Hume sees the influx of 
money from abroad as resulting primarily from a previous increase of 
industry that has lowered prices at home. Only in such a case is an 
increase in money supply favorable to economic development. Hume 
says that “[t]he good policy of the magistrate consists only in keeping 
[money], if possible still encreasing; because, by that means, he keeps 
alive a spirit of industry in the nation and encreases the stock of labour, 
in which consists all real power and riches” (Hume, Essays, 288). 
However, according to Wennerlind, “[T]his passage cannot reasonably 
be considered a proposition for an inflationist monetary or trade policy” 
(Wennerlind, “An Artificial Virtue and the Oil of Commerce,” 116). Thus, 
Hume would not favor policies designed to artificially increase the money 
stock (see also Wennerlind, “Hume’s Monetary Theory Revisited,” where 
this thesis is illustrated at length). According to Caffentzis, there is an 
important difference between policies of monetary expansion based 
on an increasing paper money supply and the policy of debasement 
that Hume appears to advocate in a footnote (see Hume, Essays, 287–
88n7): According to Caffentzis, Hume “saw that debasement might 
answer the conundrum posed by this tension between the need for 
monetary expansion and paper money scepticism” (Caffentzis, “Fiction 
or Counterfeit?” 162). Debasement is acceptable as long as is done in 
a way that preserves the illusion of identity between the new coins and 
the old coins. 
68. In order to avoid the cyclical nature of this process, Hume seems 
to propose that the operation of annihilation of money should be 
continuous. As Paganelli explains, “[A] one-time decrease in money 
supply will generate a temporary increase in sales, which brings 
money in to the economy and prices back to their original level. 
But if money keeps being annihilated, money will keep coming back 
in—it will ‘keep encreasing’” (Paganelli, “Hume on Monetary Policy,” 
76). 
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1761.69 This document shows that Reid was familiar with 
discussions surrounding the controversial issue of paper 
money since his days in Aberdeen.70 
Reid saw paper money essentially as paper credit, a form 
of credit that arises when trade develops in a nation and 
the demand for credit cannot be met by credit in the form 
of real specie money. In order to satisfy this demand for 
credit, creditors no longer lend real specie money; instead, 
they provide a piece of paper that stands for the estimated 
value in terms of real specie money of assets held by the 
creditor.
According to Reid, credit has the important function of 
making available money that has been hoarded or is oth-
erwise unused:
There must be many moneyed people who cannot themselves 
employ it [this money] in trade [. . .]. Now, if there is no Credit, 
the Money belonging to such people must be hoarded up lie 
dead and produce Nothing. But Credit makes it all active and 
Industrious. [. . .] So that it would seem that as long as there 
are Idle hands in a nation or labouring hands that might be 
more profitably employed, as long as there are heads capable 
of contriving and executing schemes of trade more extensive 
than their own fortunes without credit can enable them to 
carry on, as long as there is money lying dead and inactive, 
Credit is the proper Remedy of these Evils, bringing such 
heads and hands and Money together to cooperate for the 
public utility which before by being disunited were partly 
useless and partly burthensome to the publick.71 
As trade develops in a country, a higher rate of interest 
on credit will make the hoarded money available for use. 
Reid conjures up the following scenario: “Let us suppose 
that there is still Demand for more Money to be employed in 
69. See AUL MS 2131/2/II/16, fols. 1r–2r. 
70. Other papers by Skene are considered by Istvan Hont, Jealousy 
of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 279. 
Hont also gives reference to Bernhard Fabian, “David Skene and the 
Aberdeen Philosophical Society,” Bibliotheck 5 (1968): 81–99.  
71. AUL MS 2131/2/II/16, fol. 1r. 
138 Giovanni B. Grandi
trade after all the hoarded Money has been brought forth.”72 
In order to meet this demand for credit, Reid suggests, either 
you borrow money from abroad or you issue paper credit. 
The second solution is the one favored by Reid: “If Credit in 
general be beneficial and necessary to a Trading Nation, It is 
not easy to conceive that Paper Credit should be hurtfull.”73 
Reid then offers two objections. First, he objects to the 
quantity theory of money, the view, usually ascribed to 
John Locke and Hume, that an increase in the quantity 
of money in relation to the quantity of commodities in a 
country leads to a proportional increase in their price. Sec-
ond, he objects to Hume’s view that an increase in paper 
credit (and, consequently, of paper money) “has the same 
Effect in raising the price of Commodities as real Specie 
[. . .] that paper credit increases the price of Commodities 
in the same proportion as it increases the Current Money, 
and therefore must be prejudicial to Trade.”74 
As I said, Reid’s first objection is to the quantity theory of 
money. However, he wrongly assimilates the quantity theory 
of money to the view that the wealth of a nation is repre-
sented by the quantity of money in its possession. Moreover, 
the examples he uses to attack the quantity theory of money 
can make sense only if the quantity theory is correct.
Let’s see first how he describes the quantity theory 
of money. This theory, which relates prices to the rela-
tive quantities of commodities and money, makes the 
assumption that the demand for commodities remains the 
same. Like many alleged laws in economics, it has to be 
assumed ceteris paribus. Reid so describes the theory:
It is said that the Money that circulates is the representative 
of all the Commodities of a Nation and is equal to them 
in value. So that if the money is doubled or trebled the 
commodities continuing the same the price of everything 
will be raised in the Same proportion.75 
72. Ibid., fols. 1r–1v. 
73. Ibid., fol. 1v. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
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The first sentence states that the money that circulates 
in a country is representative of all the commodities in a 
country and is equal to them in their value. The conse-
quence drawn from it is that an increase in the quantity of 
money would lead to a proportional increase in the price of 
commodities. This consequence would be true only under 
the assumption that no other money, except the one cir-
culating in the country, were used to buy commodities and 
therefore to determine their price. This is precisely what 
the quantity theory of money assumes as a ceteris paribus 
clause. If no other money but the one present in the coun-
try at any given moment were available to buy commodi-
ties, then an increase in the quantity of money, from one 
time to another, would lead to a proportional increase in 
the price of commodities. The assumption made is that the 
only money that represents commodities is the one that is 
present in the country. But this assumption, according to 
Reid, is clearly false. He gives an analogy to illustrate his 
point:
[W]hy Should the Money of a Nation be a representation 
of the whole [stock of] commodities? There is as much 
reason to estimate every mans Stock by his ready Cash, 
which appears at first Sight ridiculous. If a Mans house 
is robbed and all the Money in his possession carried off 
he does not lose perhaps the fiftieth part of what he is 
worth.76 
What Reid says is true, but only insofar as the commodi-
ties in possession of the man can be exchanged for money 
that he does not have and that other people have. Muta-
tis mutandis, we see that the example that Reid gives to 
debunk the quantity theory of money presupposes that 
there is other money besides the money “present in a coun-
try.” This extra money could immediately be used to buy 
commodities in a country. In different words, Reid assumes 
that other money, which is presently outside a country, 
can immediately be exchanged for the commodities without 
76. Ibid.
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first becoming money that is, so to speak, “present in a 
country.” If this is the case, then an increase of only the 
money “present in a country” by itself would not lead to 
a proportional increase in the price of commodities. Price 
would indeed be determined not only in relation to the 
“money present in a country” but also in relation to the 
sum of the money “present in a country” plus the money 
that is outside the country. But this amounts to saying that 
the money that really circulates in a country is not only the 
money “present in a country” but also the money abroad. 
In short, Reid can drive his point home only by presuppos-
ing the quantity theory of money. The price of commodities 
is ultimately determined by the relation between the overall 
quantity of money and the overall quantity of commodities. 
Moreover, Reid also seems to suggest that the quantity 
theory of money goes hand in hand with a simplistic view, 
reminiscent of mercantilism, that makes the money in a 
country identical to the wealth of a country. This view is 
suggested by the use of an ambiguous expression: “the 
Money of a Nation [is] a representation of the whole [stock 
of] commodities.”77 Clearly, this view is false, as the analogy 
with the robbed man shows. But this is not what quantity 
theorists claimed. Thus Reid seems to confuse two differ-
ent claims: (1) money is representative of the riches of a 
country in the sense that is used as a universal medium of 
exchange for the commodities in a country and (2) money 
is identical to the riches of a country. 
After his remarks on the quantity theory of money, Reid 
objects to Hume’s view that an increase in paper credit 
(and, consequently, of paper money) “has the same Effect 
in raising the price of Commodities as real Specie [. . .] 
that paper credit increases the price of Commodities in the 
same proportion as it increases the Current Money, and 
therefore must be prejudicial to trade.”78 First, Reid claims 
that it is not true that an increase in paper credit will have 
an inflationary effect. For each increase in credit, there is 
77. Ibid. 
78. Ibid. 
 Hume and Reid on Political Economy 141
an increase in debt. As a consequence, the introduction 
of paper credit makes no real addition to the wealth of a 
nation: “No Man therefore is richer or thinks himself richer 
on account of these Notes.”79 Therefore, neither individuals 
nor institutions will end up spending more and pushing 
up prices. Second, even if it is true that paper credit will 
increase spending and therefore will eventually raise prices, 
this inflationary effect will be more than compensated by 
the beneficial stimulus given to trade within a nation: “[T]
he price of Commodities may gradually be raised, but this 
is the necessary effect of an extended Trade and must be 
more to the benefit of a nation than to its detriment.”80 
8. Reid’s Lectures on Money and Paper Credit
It would require further research to determine whether 
and to what extent Reid’s comments on Skene’s question 
reflect the views of other members of the Aberdeen Philo-
sophical Society like Skene. Stimulus policies based on 
government-backed issue of paper credit would appear to 
have been more consonant with Reid’s penchant for state 
intervention. In his Glasgow lectures on political economy, 
he supports hard money while acknowledging some of the 
benefits of paper money.81 
79. Ibid., fol. 2r. 
80. Ibid., fol. 2v. Reid’s discussion of Skene’s question on paper credit 
ends with some brief remarks on the Mississippi scheme: “The Notion 
of the French ministry in Law’s time that the Paper Money in the 
nation could not exceed in value the cash and that therefore it behoved 
them either to raise the value of the Coin or Reduce that of the Paper 
produced all the Confusion ruined & beggared Law and occasioned the 
ruin of thousands” (AUL MS 2131/2/II/16, fol. 2v). These final remarks 
appear to have been written at a different time. Evidence of Reid’s and 
Skene’s shared interest in political economy can be seen in a 1767 letter 
from Reid to Skene, where Reid extols the newly published Inquiry into 
the Principles of Political Economy by James Steuart (1712–80) (see The 
Correspondence of Thomas Reid, ed. Paul Wood [Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2002], 61). 
81. On Reid’s theory of money, see Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 
26–27. According to Nagao, “[Reid’s] arguments on money may have 
developed from critical readings of Hume’s [essay] on money [. . .], which 
advocated a quantity theory of money and contained an important 
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He agrees with Hume in rejecting the notion of fiat 
money: money does not receive its value from the “Laws or 
Edicts of princes.”82 He describes “the practices of Princes 
and their Ministers in debasing the Coin” as “defrauding 
their Subjects and Creditors.”83 Just like Hume, he takes 
an antimercantilist stance: among the fallacious notions 
concerning money are the views “that it may be kept in a 
Country by laws prohibiting the Exportation of it” and “that 
the Riches of a Nation Consist in the Quantity of Money 
that Circulates in it.”84 However, just like in the manu-
script on paper credit, Reid rejected the quantity theory of 
money (although no explicit argument is presented).85 
observation about the continuous effects upon demand. Reid seems 
to have agreed with this, and acknowledged the disadvantage of paper 
credit” (Nagao, “Political Economy of Reid,” 27). 
82. AUL MS 2131/4/III/10, fol. 1r. On Reid’s views on money, see 
also AUL MS 2131/4/III/4, fol. 2v, MS 2131/4/III/15, fols. 4r–v, 
and MS 2131/4/III/16. In MSS 2131/4/III/4 and 2131/4/III/15, 
Reid speaks forcefully in favor of gold and silver. In MS 2131/4/III/4, 
from March 1765, money is described as a measure of the price of 
things. Among the properties required to be a measure of price are 
“Universal Estimation & permanent Value.” Money must be “Durable 
easily conveyed. Divisible into Small parts. Silver & Gold fittest for 
this purpose.” The practices of princes in debasing coins are wrong 
because “Money is not barely a Measure of the price of things but it 
is a commodity which has an intrinsick value according to its weight 
and finenesse” (AUL MS 2131/4/III/4, fol. 2v, in Reid, Practical Ethics, 
165–66). In MS 2131/4/III/15, Reid claims that “Gold and Silver [are] a 
proper Measure of the Price of Commodities,” since, being “durable and 
always esteemed,” they do not rise and fall much in value. Moreover, 
silver and gold are divisible into small parts, their quantity and purity 
may be easily ascertained, they are “easily conveyed,” and “they keep 
without waste.” Reid further remarks that “Gold and Silver must have 
[a] Value that depends not on the will of Princes and States 1 Because it 
cannot be found out dug from Mines and Refined without much Labour 
and Expence 2 Because it has always been in demand as a commodity 
and is usefull for Vessels for ornaments for Utensils.” Thus, gold and 
silver have a natural price determined both by their cost of production 
and by their high demand for use. The price of gold and silver cannot 
be raised or lowered artificially by the state “without bringing distress 
to the country” (AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fol. 4r). 
83. AUL MS 2131/4/III/10, fol. 1r. 
84. Ibid. 
85. Reid describes the quantity theory of money in this way: “That the 
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In his lectures, Reid lists some advantages of paper 
credit. Paper credit “answers the same purpose as money 
as a measure of Value of Commodities” and is “a means 
of facilitating the Exchange of Commodities.”86 Moreover, 
it is not liable to clipping and wearing, and there is no 
need of assaying it. However, he recognized that, con-
trary to hard money, paper credit has no intrinsic value 
of its own: its value depends upon that of a correspond-
ing quantity of hard money the issuing institution has 
pledged to redeem against it. Thus, paper credit is a form 
of payment not accepted where the issuing institution is 
not known and trusted. Hard money, on the contrary, “is 
current in all nations and loses nothing of its value by 
being carried beyond Seas.”87 These are points made by 
Hume, too, and Reid seems to have been aware of Hume’s 
ideas on public debt. On this topic, the references to 
Hume are explicit: 
Of Mortgaging the Revenue & of the Public Debt. This 
enlarges the Power of the Crown. [It] Creates a Moneyed 
Interest. Where the Money is due to foreigners, [it] 
diminishes the Riches of a Nation. [It] increases the 
Number of Taxes. Whether the Multiplying of Taxes does 
price of Commodities will be doubled if the Quantity of Money in a 
Nation is doubled & raised or diminished in proportion to the Quantity 
of Money” (AUL MS 2131/4/III/10, fol. 1r). On the margin of the 
manuscript, Reid refers to Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, book 22, 
chapter 8. 
86. AUL MS 2131/4/III/10, fol. 1v. In AUL MS 2131/4/III/16, fol. 1r, 
Reid says that “Great Commerce requires much Money to carry it on.” 
Thus, it would seem that paper credit, having the same function as 
money, could enhance commerce. In AUL MS 2131/4/III/15, fols. 4r–v, 
Reid lists as number 7 among “False Notions concerning Money” the 
view that “Banks & Paper Credit [are] hurtfull to the Nation.” 
87. AUL MS 2131/4/III/10, fol. 2r. In MS 2131/4/III/16, fols. 1r–v, Reid 
lists some commodities that have been used as money in various parts 
of the world at different times: it is the same account found in Smith, 
Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, chap. 4, para. 3–4, in 1:38–39. See also Adam 
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and 
P. G. Stein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), report of 1762–63, 
vi.98 [reference by volume number of the original and by paragraph 
number], 367, and report of 1766, para. 235, 499. 
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not increase Industry & how far see Hume. It makes the 
burthen of War less Sensible.88 
Hume, on his part, moved closer to the views of the Reid 
on paper credit. In later editions of the Essays, begin-
ning from 1764, he acknowledged the limited benefits 
that paper money can have in stimulating the economy: in 
some cases, industry and credit may be promoted by the 
right use of paper money.89 He described at length the sys-
tem of bank credit in Scotland. This allowed a merchant 
to monetize a loan from a bank by giving as security his 
belongings: 
As a man may find surety nearly to the amount of his 
substance, and his bank-credit is equivalent to ready money, 
a merchant does hereby in a manner coin his houses, his 
household furniture, the goods in his warehouse, the foreign 
debts due to him, his ships at sea; and can, upon occasion, 
employ them in all payments, as if they were the current 
money of the country.90 
He appears to have been aware that this form of bank 
credit would involve a fractional reserve banking system: 
after the system had been developed, “a stock of five thou-
sand pounds was able to perform the same operations as it 
were six or seven.”91 However, he was still cautious about 
the benefits of paper credit: “[W]hatever other advan-
tages result from these inventions, it must still be allowed 
that besides giving too great facility to credit, which is 
88. AUL MS 2131/4/III/11, fol. 2v. 
89. See Hume, Essays, 318–20. Apparently, Hume changed his mind after 
talking with the financier Isaac de Pinto in Paris. See Ian Simpson Ross, 
“The Emergence of David Hume as a Political Economist: A Biographical 
Sketch,” in Wennerlind and Schabas, David Hume’s Political Economy, 
44–46. Hume’s involvement in the settlement of Canada Bills may also 
have played a role in qualifying his view on paper credit (see Robert W. 
Dimand, “David Hume on Canadian Paper Money,” in Wennerlind and 
Schabas, David Hume’s Political Economy, 168–79). 
90. Hume, Essays, 319. 
91. Ibid., 320. 
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dangerous, they banish the precious metals.”92 Hume also 
maintained his opposition to public debt.
As we have seen, Reid’s opposition to commercial society 
is not justified by the alleged inefficiency of markets in the 
allocation of scarce resources, but is mostly rooted in a 
moral evaluation of the character of the merchant. Hume, 
on the contrary, was more appreciative of the new figure 
of the merchant. On the contentious issue of paper credit, 
Hume’s and Reid’s positions, however different, seem to 
have been much closer than in their general evaluation of 
the benefits and drawbacks of a commercial society. Reid 
outlined a practical program of economic policies in his 
lectures, but this clearly had not much to do with his radi-
cal utopian ideals. In his turn, Hume, also motivated by 
pragmatic concerns, qualified his original condemnation 
of paper credit. This shows us that a fundamental dis-
agreement in political ideology may not necessarily and 
always translate into a disagreement about policies. 
92. Ibid.
